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This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be
more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose
on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (2017), who
argue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean meta-
physics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Superve-
nience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism.
This undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion that Humean Supervenience and
the Growing-Block theory are incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-
Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maxi-
malism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. Finally, I point
out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is dis-
putable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion and supporting
the moral that metaphysical theories—or at least Humean Supervenience, the
Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little constrained by truthmaking
commitments.
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1 Introduction
Briggs and Forbes (2017) allege an incompatibility between two widely discussed meta-
physical theories: Humean Supervenience—the thesis that everything supervenes on
the Humean mosaic—and Growing-Block theory—the thesis that the universe is a
4-dimensional growing block composed by the present and the past. Yet this incom-
patibility holds only if additional premises are granted, one of which is truthmaker
maximalism—the view that every truth is made true by something in the world.
The authors defend a standard version of this view by appealing to its relation with
Humean Supervenience. The relation of Humean Supervenience with truthmaker
maximalism is interesting by itself. Is a Humean naturally led to endorse a standard
version of truthmaker maximalism, as Briggs and Forbes argue?
In this paper, first I assess the relation between Humean Supervenience and
truthmaker maximalism, concluding that Humean Supervenience is not committed to
the standard version of truthmaker maximalism required by Briggs and Forbes.
Second, I argue that their defense of truthmaker maximalism on the assumption
of a Growing-Block universe is incorrect: the reasons for endorsing the Growing-Block
2
theory do not commit us to endorse any version of truthmaker maximalism (even when
the latter is restricted to some future contingent statements).
Finally, the demand of truthmakers for future contingent statements implicitly
depends on another of the authors’ premises, namely that some future contingent
statements have truth values. But, as I point out here, this is a disputed thesis,
inadequately justified, and in a Humean Growing-block universe is hardly plausible,
if not false.
Each of these three arguments suffices to undermine Briggs and Forbes’s conclu-
sion that “either Humean Supervenience or Growing-Block theory has to be false”.
Now, the premises that I criticize are sometimes assumed, explicitly or implicitly, in
other debates in contemporary analytic metaphysics. Thus, more generally, each of
these three arguments aims to support the moral that metaphysical theories—or at
least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little
constrained by truthmaking commitments. Hence, this paper aims to contribute to
the debate about the methodology and legitimacy of metaphysics by urging caution on
widespread strategies stemming from the twentieth century linguistic turn—along the
lines of Lewis (1992); Varzi (2007); Wisnewski (2007); Liggins (2008); Betti (2014);
Simpson (2014); Skiles (2014); Barceló (2015); Tallant (2018); Asay and Baron (2019);
among others (see also references in §3.2).
2 The alleged incompatibility between Humean Super-
venience and the Growing-Block theory
A substantial, carefully argued, metaphysical thesis is laid out in “The Growing-Block:
Just One Thing After Another?” (Briggs and Forbes, 2017, Philosophical Studies 174,
4). The authors defend an incompatibility between two theses:
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Humean Supervenience: The thesis that the world is fundamentally a vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact and that everything else, including any
modal fact, supervenes on the mosaic.
Growing-Block theory: The theory that the past and the present are real, unlike the future,
such that the universe is a four-dimensional block that grows as
the present changes and becomes part of the past.
To defend their incompatibility, they appeal to certain premises which they then
defend. Two of these premises are:
Truthmaker Maximalism: The thesis that every true proposition is true in virtue of some-
thing in the world. In a more modest formulation, it is the thesis
truth supervenes on being.
Truths about the Future: The thesis that there are non-trivial truths about the future. That
is, some future contingent statements have truth values at their
times of utterance (e.g. “There will be a solar eclipse on December
14, 2020”).
Briggs and Forbes (2017) admit that there might be counterexamples to Truthmaker
Maximalism (for instance, mathematical truths), but they only need this principle to
hold for some future contingent statements, and they argue that it does hold for this
subset of cases.
From these premises—together with a third premise which I will not challenge—they
conclude that either Humean Supervenience or Growing-Block theory has to be
false. In a nutshell, the incompatibility arises because Growing-Block theory faces
the challenge of explaining what makes future statements true, and any such expla-
nation turns out to be unattainable if one assumes a Humean ontology.1
For how could future contingent statements be grounded in a Growing-Block
universe? The only way to achieve this seems to be to resort to a revised version of
1Their other premise is: “If some propositions about the future are made true by something (or
things) not in the future, then there are irreducible necessary connections between distinct existents”
(Briggs and Forbes, 2017, 928). Indeed, this may sound like the least obvious of the three premises.
Still, this paper focuses on criticizing Briggs and Forbes’s defense of the other two, as they are
sometimes assumed in other debates in contemporary metaphysics.
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Truthmaker Maximalism, similar to that proposed in the literature addressing the
grounding problem for presentism (Tallant, 2009b; cf. Tooley, 1997, 41, Meyer, 2013,
25). According to the revised version proposed for presentism, truth supervenes not
only on actual (i.e. present) being but also on past and future being. An analogously
revised principle for the Growing-Block theory tells us that
Revised Truthmaker Maximalism: Truth supervenes on being or future being.2
With this revised principle in hand, a Humean Growing Block theorist is able to
ground future contingent statements—they are grounded in future being. However,
a Humean cannot coherently accept this revised version, because she is committed
to rejecting irreducible hypothetical properties. Recall that Humean Supervenience is
inspired by David Hume’s (alleged) skepticism towards any necessary connections in
nature. In a similar spirit, Sider (2001) advocates the rejection of (irreducible, unless
otherwise specified) hypothetical properties:
“What seems common to all cheats is that irreducibly hypothetical prop-
erties are postulated, whereas proper ontology should invoke only categor-
ical, or occurrent, properties and relations. Categorical properties involve
what objects are actually like, whereas hypothetical properties ‘point be-
yond’ their instances” (Sider, 2001, 41)
In Sider’s terms, then, categorical properties belong to the fundamental structure of
the world, while hypothetical properties don’t. Accordingly, Briggs and Forbes (2017,
935) reasonably claim: “the objection the Humean has to irreducible modality is at
heart the same objection Sider has to hypothetical properties.” This includes the
rejection of temporal properties (e.g., the temporal property of there being a sea-
battle tomorrow), so “the Humean would be failing to follow the spirit of their own
view if they accepted an appeal to what WILL exist but doesn’t” (Briggs and Forbes,
2017, 935).
Therefore, we will be able to ground future contingent statements in a Growing-
Block universe only if we appeal to modal notions or hypothetical properties—but
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this is inconsistent with a Humean metaphysics, which is wary of primitive modal
notions and hypothetical properties. Hence the incompatibility.
3 The independence of metaphysics from truthmaking
However, the argument just presented is unsound, for Humean Supervenience does
not commit us, I will argue, to the required standard version of Truthmaker Max-
imalism (§3.1). Furthermore, Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any
version of Truthmaker Maximalism (§3.2). Finally, a more general worry is that
Truthmaker Maximalism is a disputed thesis, in turn relying on Truths about
the future in the context of future contingent statements, which is also a disputed
thesis, inadequately justified, and especially implausible in a Humean Growing-block
universe (§3.3).
Still, Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion does follow from their premises. That is
interesting in itself. And given that one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s
modus tollens, if we assume that Humean Supervenience and Growing-Block the-
ory are compatible, Briggs and Forbes’s argument could instead be seen as a reductio
of Truthmaker Maximalism.3
3.1 Is the Humean led to endorse standard truthmaker maximalism?
First, although the rejection of hypothetical properties seems in line with the Humean
spirit, it could be objected that this is nevertheless an additional and thus unjustified
assumption. For Humean Supervenience may be endorsed for certain reasons—such
as, say, the rejection of primitive modal notions—without necessarily having any
trouble with hypothetical properties. That is, Sider’s stance can be seen as an inde-
pendent, stronger, commitment that the Humean does not need to endorse.
3In the modus ponens {p → q; p |= q}, p is Truthmaker Maximalism, and q is the incompatibility
between Humean Supervenience and Growing-Block theory. Then, the modus tollens concludes
that ¬p. (Cf. this suggestion with the criticisms cited in §3.2 esp. fn 3.2.)
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More importantly, even granting that Humean Supervenience commits us to re-
jecting hypothetical properties, this is nevertheless insufficient to establish the stan-
dard version of truthmaker maximalism that Briggs and Forbes require. In other
words, contra Briggs and Forbes (2017, 935), Sider’s stance does not preclude the
revised version of truthmaker maximalism described above.
Sider’s aim is to avoid postulating hypothetical properties in our ontology. But
this does not preclude a revised version of truthmaker maximalism, since the lat-
ter merely appeals to future truthmakers that do not exist yet, i.e. to hypothetical
properties. That is, we can accept Sider’s rejection of hypothetical properties in
our fundamental ontology while speaking of hypothetical properties and appealing to
them to ground truth-values. There is no reason for a Humean to refuse to appeal
to hypothetical properties merely because, on her view, fundamental reality does not
include them. It does not follow that appealing to X implies that X exists.4 The dis-
tinction between ‘speaking of’ and ‘ontologically committing to’, or in other words,
between ‘appealing to’ and ‘postulating’, is not new, but has been invoked throughout
the history of philosophy. This corresponds to the ancient warning against reifying
linguistic discourse—the paradigmatic example being the medieval nominalist criti-
cizing the realist about universals (dating back to Stoicism (Modrak, 2012, 659-60)).
Accordingly, appealing to future truthmakers need not amount to any more than just
talking about something—something that we are expecting that it will be the case.
There is, then, no need to reify, i.e. actually postulate, future truthmakers now.
(Compare Section 4, where I raise an analogous criticism to Quine’s metaontological
criterion of ontological commitment.)
At this point one might object that, still, hypothetical properties are appealed
to here to ground future contingent statements, and grounding has to be done by
categorical properties—by something existent! Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect
that something existent grounds the truth-value of future contingent statements, and
hypothetical properties do not exist. (One might think that the truths of mathematics
4Nor is there any problem for the Growing-Block theory in appealing to the non-existent future.
This theory, unlike Humean Supervenience, is neutral about ontological commitments to non-existent
entities. The neutrality of presentism regarding the ontological commitments to abstracta is defended
by Filomeno (2016), which mutatis mutandis holds for the Growig-block theory.
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or fictional discourse do not need something existent to make them true, but this is
harder to maintain for future contingent statements.)
However, Revised Truthmaker Maximalism is immune to this objection. This
version explicitly postulates that truthmakers need not exist: truth supervenes on
being or future being. What this revised version requires is that truthmakers exist
sooner or later, at some period of time. See Westphal (2006), who argues that it is
facts, as ordinarily understood, that make future-tensed statements true—facts that
will obtain when their time comes. Then, grounding is, in the end, done by categorical
properties5—by properties that in the future, not now, are part of being.
This revised principle is thus consistent with a Humean ontology, as only cate-
gorical properties are included in the ontology.6 In sum, Humean Supervenience is
not committed to a standard version of truthmaker maximalism.
For different reasons, Sorensen (2001, Ch. 11) and Greenough (2008) (following
Quine, 1981) have defended the existence of truthmaking gaps, implying that there are
truths without truthmakers. These authors preserve classical bivalent logic and hold
that there are no truth-value gaps, while there are truthmaker gaps. Their reasons
come from paradoxes (the Liar, but also the truth-teller and other variants) and
vagueness puzzles. They remind us that the truths of the laws of logic are ungrounded,
something which is also familiar from foundationalist view in epistemology.
Moreover, this objection—that grounding should be done by something presently
existent—can also be disarmed by endorsing the view presented in §3.3, according to
which future contingent statements lack truth-values, a view especially plausible in a
Humean Growing-block universe. In such case there is nothing to be grounded, so we
needn’t go looking for truthmakers.
5As constituents of, say, larger states of affairs.
6In general, not only from the Humean viewpoint, the revised version seems more reasonable
than the standard version. It can be said that the truth-value of a proposition about a certain
period of time is grounded by what (part of) the world is like at that period of time. Furthermore,
a proposition’s truth-value is independent from the times at which its utterance is made (leaving of
course aside indexical propositions). So, while (part of) the world at a certain period of time grounds
propositions about that period, there is no requirement that the world at that period continues to
exist at any other time (cf. Westphal, 2006).
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3.2 Is Growing-Block theory led to endorse truthmaking maximal-
ism?
Hence, a Humean metaphysics is not committed to a standard version truthmaker
maximalism. This by itself suffices to refute Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. But,
furthermore, their premise of truthmaker maximalism, in any version, is a disputed
thesis and their defense of it, recurring to Growing-Block theory, is flawed.
That truthmaker maximalism is a disputed thesis is attested by the literature
on truthmaking as well as by the literature on the grounding problem for presentism.
Beginning with Lewis (1992, 215-219) in response to Armstrong (2004), criticisms of
truthmaker maximalism have more recently been given, e.g., by Williamson (1999),
Wisnewski (2007), Liggins (2008), Tallant (2009a), Jago (2013), Skiles (2014), and
Simpson (2014). Yet of course there are also those who have explicitly defended the
principle, e.g. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006), Cameron (2008), Barrio and Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2015), and Jago (2020). Similarly, part of the literature addressing the
grounding problem for presentism has questioned truthmaker maximalism (or pro-
vided a revised version); see e.g. Keller (2004, §2), Tallant (2009b), Caplan and
Sanson (2010), and Tallant and Ingram (2015).
One line of thought here is to stress that the principle should be defended not
in virtue of its alleged intuitive appeal (as intuition can be seen to be, or is, an
unreliable guide to truth), but rather by testing whether the principle holds in all
cases (Tallant, 2009b, 414). Then, following this methodology the principle hardly
seems plausible, given the variety of counterexamples: negative truths, past and future
truths, mathematical truths, and fictional truths. Another line of thought is that
dispensing with the principle is more ontologically parsimonious (Tallant, 2009a, §6).
Yet another line of thought is that, much as the concept ‘lack’ in discussions about
truthmakers of negative existentials does not lead us to think that the lack of some
state of affairs should be reified, similarly the concept ‘past’ should not lead us to
think that the past should be reified (ibidem, 424).
That being said, Briggs and Forbes (2017, §5) try to defend the principle aided by
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the considerations that (i) they only need this principle to hold for future contingent
statements, and (ii) this premise is more plausible within the context of Growing-
Block theory than it is outside this context.
The reason for (ii) is that, given that the past exists, there is a truthmaker for a
sentence such as:
(S*) There was a sea battle yesterday.
And this suggests that there should also be a truthmaker for:
(S) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
As Briggs and Forbes (2017, 934) put it, “What asymmetry could there possibly be
between (S) and (S*), such that (S*) requires a truthmaker while (S) does not?”
However, this defense of truthmaker maximalism for future contingent state-
ments in a Growing-Block universe is flawed. There is an asymmetry between (S)
and (S*), such that (S*) may be held to have a truthmaker while (S) does not need
a truthmaker: namely, that (S*) is a past sentence and (S) is a future sentence. This
asymmetry is relevant in a Growing-Block universe, where there is an ontological
asymmetry between the reality of the past and the unreality of the future. In fact,
one motivation for believing in Growing-Block theory is that it captures the ap-
parent asymmetry of the past being settled, unlike the future (Hoefer, 2019, Ch.1);
and this ontological asymmetry naturally fits with there being truthmakers for past
sentences but not for future sentences.
Thus, Growing-Block theory does not commit us to truthmakers for the future,
so it does not lend credibility to any version of truthmaker maximalism. We then
seem to have no reason to endorse this premise. And if we do not endorse it, a fortiori
the incompatibility claimed by Briggs and Forbes does not follow.
3.3 Must future contingents have truth-values?
Finally, there remains a more general objection to the demand for truthmakers in
this favorable context of future contingent statements, which applies to any version
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of truthmaker maximalism, and independently of any metaphysical theory.
The demand for truthmakers for future contingent statements implicitly depends
on another premise which can and has been disputed: that future contingent state-
ments have truth-values. That is, it depends on Truths about the future. Briggs
and Forbes (2017, §4) also try to defend this premise, but they merely reply to one
objection and then present the semantics for future truths that they proposed in
(Briggs and Forbes, 2012). This is insufficient, as there are alternative views accord-
ing to which future contingent statements lack truth-values now. These alternatives
are not implausible, as I elaborate below, so Briggs and Forbes’s view cannot be taken
for granted. Even worse, I argue that in our Humean Growing-Block universe this
premise is barely tenable, if not inconsistent.
Since Aristotle first pondered the truth-value of the sentence “There will be a
sea battle tomorrow”, various answers to the problem of future contingents have been
proposed. One view is that at least some future contingent statements already (or
always) have a truth-value. However, several alternative views deny this; that is, they
deny Truths about the future. For instance, since the Epicureans, some views
hold that the world might be fundamentally indeterministic, and they treat future
contingent statements as neither true nor false, but rather as undetermined. Even
if the world were deterministic, since the future is still non-existent, it can be said
that any presently uttered proposition about any future event still lacks a truth-
value—for there is nothing in reality that makes such sentences true or false. In the
indeterministic scenario, this lack of truth-values is more patent: not only is there
nothing existent that can be said to correspond to the proposition, but it is unsettled
whether it will occur—whether the proposition will be true or false.
Such undetermination can be modelled as a third truth-value, as in Jan  Lukasiewicz’s
three-valued semantics (Prior, 1953). Other views that treat future contingents as nei-
ther true nor false include supervaluationism (Thomason, 1970); so-called Priorean
Ockhamism (Belnap et al., 2002); and relativism (MacFarlane, 2003, 2008). These
semantics can model a world where the future is unsettled and future contingent
statements lack a settled truth-value. And such a world is not far-fetched. The actual
world may well be indeterministic such that no future events are determined. Then,
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even very likely events such as the predicted solar eclipse on October 14 2023 would,
strictly speaking, not be determined with probability 1.
Rejecting Truths about the future can mean affirming either that all future
contingents lack truth-value, or that they are all false. We can say, encompassing
both of these options, that any future contingent is untrue. Each variant comes at
a certain cost. For instance, endorsing  Lukasiewicz’s three-valued semantics implies
rejecting the principle of future excluded middle. This principle is a future-tensed
version of tertium non datur, stating that either at some future time t, p, or at some
future time t, ¬p is. Formally: Ftp ∨ Ft¬p. This can be accepted, but it will lead
us to deny that Ftp ∨ ¬Ftp is a tautology, despite its having the form of a classical
tautology Φ ∨ ¬Φ.7
Aside from the trade-offs, one objection to the views I am putting forward is that
it follows that one should never assert anything about the future. For, according to
these views,8 all future contingents are untrue. This can be solved by (1) adopting
the view of the Thin Red Line (although it has been accused of incoherence, because
it confers a special status to one branch, which violates the initial assumption of the
future being contingent and truly indeterministic); or (2) revising or rejecting the
Truth Norm for assertion; or (3) following MacFarlane (2014, 231)’s proposal to just
accept this consequence, while taking on the philosophical task of clarifying why this
is right, despite its seeming strange.
Now, the key point that differentiates Briggs and Forbes’s view from these views
is that it could be thought that an indeterministic world still allows for some future
7If one wants to keep all classical tautological inferences valid, one can choose the supervaluationist
semantics, at the cost of denying that a disjunction can be true only if one of its disjuncts is; see
Briggs and Forbes (2012, 14) for an excellent summary of the trade-offs. Besides, advocates of
 Lukasiewicz logic reject the rules Reductio ad Absurdum and Contraposition: these fail because
classical contradictions, such as Fp∨¬Fp, may a lack truth-value, and therefore have untrue negations.
Conditional proofs fail for similar reasons; see Briggs and Forbes (2012, 24). In comparison with
supervaluationism,  Lukasiewicz assigns truth values to far fewer sentences, as every classical tautology
has untrue instances, including the law of excluded middle (Briggs and Forbes, 2012, 21); although
I don’t see this as a substantial virtue or flaw. To conclude, the balance of trade-offs is longer and
requires philosophical assessment, see ibidem; Iacona (2020); Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2020). Now, we
do not need to decide anything here; we just need to outline the plausibility of the alternatives.
8This includes 3-valued  Lukasiewicz semantics, Supervaluationism, Peirce’s models, and MacFar-
lane’s relativism.
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contingent statements having, in the present, determined truth-values. In fact, the
future occurrence of certain macroscopic events hardly seems deniable. Consider, for
instance, the aforementioned solar eclipse on October 14 2023, the death of the Sun,
or the heat death of the universe.
However, this point is weakly founded for two reasons. One reason is that it con-
flates something very likely with something settled. The small difference in probability
between ‘0.999999...’ and ‘1’ implies the big conceptual difference between a proposi-
tion’s truth-value being settled and it not being settled. The values ‘0.999999...’ and
‘1’ may be interchangeable for all practical purposes, but their metaphysical implica-
tions are substantially different. All sorts of overwhelmingly likely events, such as the
next solar eclipse, may not be determined. And if the occurrence of all future events is
not completely determined, then the propositions that predict their occurrence must
not have determined truth-values. 9 10
The second, more specific, reason against Truths about the future is that
we are assuming a Humean Growing-block universe. In such a universe, no future
contingent statement can have a settled truth-value. A Humean account of laws (such
as the ‘Best System Account’) does not confer any governing role to the laws. Laws
are merely the best compressed description of the patterns in the Humean mosaic.
Laws then do not prescribe any events at any time. In particular, Humean laws
can be deterministic or indeterministic (whatever is the best axiomatization of the
patterns in the mosaic, be it deterministic or indeterministic, will constitute the laws
of nature), but in any case such laws do not determine what happens in the unfolding
9This first consideration against Truths about the Future does not hold if the world turns
out to be deterministic, of course. For not only solar eclipses, but everything would be determined,
and therefore settled. But of course, no one wants to need to assume determinism. The next reason
applies regardless of whether the world is deterministic or not.
10There might be a way to justify the objection that propositions about some future macroscopic
events have truth-values. The philosophy of physics literature on emergence has stressed the uni-
versality of certain events, irrespective of their details at the fundamental level. For instance, the
occurrence of thermodynamic behavior may be independent of both initial conditions (the positions
and velocities of gas particles in a closed container, say) and fundamental dynamics (the Newtonian
laws guiding such particles) (Frigg 2009, cf. Batterman, 2018; Filomeno, Forthcoming). Then, a
future event such as the increase of entropy in the universe seems to be a macroscopic event that
will definitely occur, even if the fundamental laws are indeterministic. However, this speculation is
disputable (e.g. it is unclear that the universality is really applying to any branch).
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future. This means that what will occur in a Humean Growing-Block universe, i.e.
how the Humean mosaic will unfold, is not determined by the laws but is rather a
contingent brute fact. Thus, any given future event is neither partially determined
by laws, nor by the present, nor by the past, nor by anything else. It seems hard,
then, to maintain that a proposition about a non-existent and undetermined brute
fact has some settled truth-value before its occurrence. And notably, this includes
propositions about any future event, even overwhelmingly likely ones such as solar
eclipses.
Hence, to wrap up in reverse order, (i) I have argued that in the scenario of a
Humean Growing Block, the view that future contingents have truth-values is unten-
able; and (ii) this has been preceded by the more general observation that it cannot
be taken for granted that future contingents have truth-values, as there are plausible
views that maintain that every future contingent is undetermined. Hence, if we do
not endorse Truths about the future, then there are no truth-values of future con-
tingent statements to be grounded by any version of Truthmaker Maximalism; so
again, a fortiori, the incompatibility claimed by Briggs and Forbes does not follow.
4 Conclusion
The three arguments given in Section 3 aim to support that Humean Supervenience
is compatible with Growing-Block theory11 and, more generally, the moral that
contemporary analytic metaphysics should be cautious regarding the constraints that
truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. In other words, meta-
physics is largely independent of the alleged constraints of truthmaking theory, in
the sense that it is barely constrained by them. Metaphysical theories retain a large
degree of freedom from such linguistic considerations. Truthmaking considerations
hardly constrain our metaphysics, unless they constrain it ex hypothesi, but then
they are incurring in a petitio principii. The same conclusion is defended by Tallant
11In fact, Humeanism is compatible with any ontological theory of time, since the same solution to
the grounding problem applies, mutatis mutandis, to presentism; and it is compatible with eternalism.
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(2018), who argues that truthmaking theory, when trying to determine our ontological
commitments, is forced to assume some prior notion of which entities are dubious.
This moral can be framed in a wider perspective. Consider a precedent of truth-
maker theory, Quine’s (1954) influential criterion of ontological commitment—a main
responsible of revitalizing metaphysics after the linguistic turn. According to Quine,
the scope of the quantifiers in a regimented language guides us in determining what
there is: to use quantifiers to refer to entities while denying that one is ontologically
committed is to fail to own up to one’s commitments, and thereby engage in a sort
of doublethink (Bricker, 2016, §1.6.3). However, also this incurs in a petitio principii,
unless such meta-ontological criterion is properly justified on other grounds. (Again,
the same problematic dialectics is also found in a discussion in the vicinity; see Bricker
2016, §3.2.) Furthermore, there are alternative meta-ontological criteria, such as the
Meinongian (see Berto and Plebani, 2015, Part II for other alternatives). The exis-
tence of alternative criteria suggests the meta-metaphysical conjecture that perhaps
deciding among them cannot be positively decided. I do not mean that it is a verbal
dispute, but rather that if we assume that no criterion is better justified than any
other, we lack a substantial reason to decide, and thus metaphysics is independent
of—unconstrained by—these disputes.
Similarly, returning to the debate on future contingents, the different seman-
tics developed are motivated by adhering to certain desiderata. Subsequently, such
semantics are hoped to be that which captures more accurately the metaphysical
structure of the world—that which “carves at the joints”. One desideratum has been
to accommodate the idea that some future contingents (like the eclipse sentence) al-
ready have a truth-value now. While this is not an unmotivated desideratum (as the
examples mentioned attest), it is, however, too fragile a foundation for supporting
the metaphysical significance of the corresponding logical semantics. Faced with the
also fragile motivations of the alternatives, a precise, commensurable, discussion of
the weight of the trade-offs might be unattainable. This kind of incommensurability
between criteria bolsters the undecidability of metaphysics. Fortunately, the scope
of this pessimistic diagnosis is limited: a careful analysis of the trade-offs may well
clearly tip the balance. Yet the often neglected point is that sometimes, perhaps too
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often, we encounter situations in which the foundations of the assumptions are too
fragile (i.e. poorly justified), and a precise, commensurable, discussion of the weight
of the trade-offs is unattainable. In the end, the metaphysical issue at stake might
never be positively settled.12
It is worth adding that in current theoretical physics similar methodological wor-
ries have recently been raised: not due to an excessive focus on natural language, but
rather due to an allegedly excessive focus on the beauty of mathematical language.
Some criteria guiding theoretical physics have been criticized as unreliable, fragile
criteria: the technical notion of naturalness, the elegance of the mathematical formu-
lation, as well as the acclaimed criteria of unification and simplicity, which have also
been hugely influential in philosophy. These criticisms have recently been popular-
ized by Hossenfelder (2018), while previous abundant discussions can be found in the
philosophy of science literature.
Summing up, the diagnosis that too much (ontological) weight is given to linguis-
tic considerations goes along the lines of the aforementioned Lewis (1992, 215-219);
Williamson (1999); Keller (2004, §2); Varzi (2007); Wisnewski (2007); Liggins (2008);
Betti (2014); Simpson (2014); Skiles (2014); Tallant (2018); Asay and Baron (2019).
In other words, the moral is that, unfortunately, it does not seem that such meta-
ontological criteria undergirding analytic metaphysics can reliably guide us to the
truth.
Obviously, naturalistic metaphysics comes here to mind as a potential savior.
However, let me just note that it is not clear that the astonishing success of physics
is sufficient today to legitimize the enterprise of naturalistic metaphysics: in order for
the naturalistic approach to be informative as to what there fundamentally is, not
only one must accept scientific realism; one should also believe, against the scientific
12Alongside this fragile foundation of some linguistic-driven criteria in metaphysics lies the well-
known unreliability of our intuitions and the manifest image. This has been highlighted for centuries,
and the more the scientific image develops, the further it departs from the manifest image, so the
more the latter appears as an unreliable, fragile basis for discovering the fundamental structure of the
world. In fact, inspired by the astonishing discoveries of modern physics, Richard Feynman (leaving
aside his funny but poor comparison of philosophy of science with ornithology) raised an illustrative
point which should be kept in mind by those of us investigating “armchair” metaphysics: Nature’s
imagination has turned out to be, as we have a posteriori discovered, much greater than man’s.
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consensus, that current physics is close to the fundamental physics, close to something
like a ‘Theory of Everything’. Yet it is not; e.g., it is officially acknowledged that
Quantum Field Theory is not a fundamental theory. In other words, one has to, first,
hope that the “unknown unknowns” won’t drastically change the current scientific
image (the antirealist pessimistic meta-induction objection). Then, even worse, one
has also to ignore the “known unknowns”, i.e. the numerous unsolved problems of the
current Standard Model that suggest that we are far from a fundamental theory (e.g.,
the inconsistency between general relativity and quantum mechanics, understanding
dark energy, the hierarchy problem, and basically all the reasons that motivate the
research of physics beyond the Standard Model).13
If all this is correct, it is of course saddening for those of us who wish to investigate
the fundamental aspects of reality beyond the limited scope of empirical evidence—
who wish that the historically threatened legitimacy of metaphysics were on firmer
ground.
References
Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Asay, Jamin, and Sam Baron. “Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.” The Philosophical
Quarterly 70, 278 (2019): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz036.
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